MOHD KHIRUDIN BIN YAAKUB vs PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (MJLR2009a27) Abdul Aziz,SS
1
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
MALAYSIA
IN THE HIGH COURT IN SABAH AND SARAWAK AT KUCHING
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 42-14-2008-II
BETWEEN
MOHD KHIRUDIN BIN YAAKUB … APPELLANT
AND
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT
[From the Kuching Sessions Court Criminal Case No.: SC-61-01-
2006-I]
BETWEEN
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … COMPLAINANT
AND
MOHD KHIRUDIN BIN YAAKUB … ACCUSED
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
Y.A. DATO’ ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHIM
IN OPEN COURT
2
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
JUDGMENT
The appellant was convicted and sentenced on an amended charge
under section 11(a) of the Anti Corruption Act 1997 [‘the Act’] for
accepting a gratification of RM100.00 from one Ong Su Ann (PW1)
as an inducement forbearing not to take action against one Chong
Fook Teck (PW6) who allegedly had committed an offence under
s.26(1) and s.15(1) of Road Traffic Act 1987.
The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and a fine
of RM10,000.00 in default 6 months imprisonment. The appellant was
granted a stay of execution pending the disposal of this appeal.
At the material time the appellant was an Enforcement Officer
attached to the Enforcement Unit, Road Transport Department,
Kuching.
The appellant’s appeal is against conviction and sentence. The
appellant raised several grounds of appeal.
The first ground is that the prosecution has not established a prima
facie case on the essential ingredients of the offence to justify the
calling of the defence. It was argued that the learned trial sessions
Court Judge failed to embark on a maximum evaluation of the
prosecution’s evidence tested in cross-examination on the essential
ingredient of the charge.
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
The main evidence by the prosecution on the acceptance by the
appellant of the gratification came from the testimonies of PW1 and
PW6. The evidence is that 4th February 2005 at about 9.10 a.m.
PW1 was stopped by the appellant while driving a motor vehicle.
PW1 was asked to produce his driving licence. But PW1 could not do
so. PW1 admitted that he had no driving licence at the material time.
PW1 told the appellant that if the appellant wanted to issue a
summon the appellant has to do it quickly as he (PW1) was in hurry.
The appellant then asked for PW1’s identity card which PW1
subsequently gave to the appellant. But the appellant still refused to
issue PW1 with a summons. Instead, PW1 testified that the appellant
asked him to call the owner of the car that he was driving to come
and see the appellant. Using one of the JPJ officer’s hand-phone,
PW1 called PW6 who later came to the scene. PW1 then tried to
negotiate with the appellant and requested the appellant to forget the
whole thing and asked whether there is any other way to make
resolve the matter fast. PW1 then testified that one of the JPJ’s
officers present at the scene said ‘when you see a road block you
should have at least RM50.00 to settle’. After that, PW1 said the
appellant let him continued on his journey. However, when PW1
asked for the return of his identity card, the appellant told PW1 that if
he wanted his identity card back he could come to the JPJ office later
that day at 2.00 p.m. and to bring along RM100.00 to collect his
identity card.
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
The appellant then released PW1 and the latter went back to his
employer’s workshop. PW6 then contacted one of his customers
known as Mr. Lee (PW8) for help. PW6 testified that Mr. Lee was a
policeman. As it turns out Mr. Lee is an officer attached to the ACA.
Soon afterwards Mr. Lee arrived at PW6’s workshop with two other
ACA officers. When PW6 had told the ACA officers about the
incident, he was given two pieces of RM50.00 notes [Exhibits P5 (a)
and (b) ] to be given to the appellant at the appellant’s office, and was
asked to remember the serial number of the two notes. The ACA was
setting up a trap for the appellant.
When PW1 and PW6 went to the appellant’s office later that day,
PW6 placed two (2) RM50.00 notes on the appellant’s table. The
evidence was that the appellant was surprised. After PW1 and PW6
left the appellant’s office they gave a pre-arranged signal to the
waiting ACA’s officers indicating that the money had been given to
the appellant. The ACA’s officers then approached the appellant’s
office. On seeing the approaching ACA’s officers the appellant
grabbed the two RM50.00 notes on his table and quickly walked
towards the toilet. He was followed by the ACA’s officers. Nearing
the toilet the ACA’s officers heard the toilet being flushed. Thereafter
the ACA’s officers rushed to the septic tank where the flushed water
from the toilet flowed. There they managed to retrieve one of the
marked RM50.00 notes. Subsequently the appellant was arrested.
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
It was submitted for the appellant that the prosecution must prove
that the appellant received RM100.00 from PW1 and PW6. In this
regard it was argued that PW1 and PW6 trap were witnesses.
The law as to trap witness is that its evidence must be corroborated;
and if it is not corroborated the learned trial Judge must warn himself
of the danger of convicting an accused on an uncorroborated
evidence of such witness: Mohamed Taufik v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 36;
Mohamed Mokhtar v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 22. The rational for this is that
a trap witness is an interested party : Ramli Sutu v PP [1998] 5 CLJ
671.
Counsel for appellant submitted that the failure of the learned trial
Judge to warn himself of the danger of convicting on an
uncorroborated evidence of a trap witness amounts to a misdirection
that occasions a failure and a miscarriage of justice.
The issue at this juncture is whether the learned trial Judge had
misdirected himself on corroboration of PW1 and PW6’s evidence
and whether there is corroboration of their evidence.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial
Judge misdirected himself on corroboration of PW1’s and PW6’s
evidence. He further submitted that the learned trial Judge’s finding
at p.183 of the Appeal Record that the evidence of PW1 and PW6 as
to the money been handed over to the appellant was corroborated
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
and therefore attracts the presumption under section 42(1) of the Act
is unsupported by evidence in this instant case.
I do not find any merits in these submissions. There is no doubt that
PW1 and PW6 were trap witnesses. However this fact is amply
recognized by the learned trial Judge when in his judgment at p.185
of the Appeal Record said that ‘[I]n the instant case, though the
money was not found in the possession of the accused after when
the ACA’s officers conducted the arrest, that does not restraint this
Court from making a prima facie finding that the accused had
received the gratification from PW1 as there is direct and
circumstantial evidence to support so.’.
There are evidences to support this conclusion. PW1 testified that he
made several phone calls to the appellant requesting for the return of
his identity card. The appellant denied receiving the phone calls.
However the appellant said the caller was unknown to him; and
because he was annoyed with the calls he had asked the caller to
come to his JPJ’s office. This was fact that was found by the learned
trial Judge as the truth. In his grounds of decision at p. 133 of the
Appeal Record, the learned trial Judge, ‘have noted there were not
less than 3 telephone calls from PW1 to meet and just to collect the
I.C. from the accused whereby the accused has not taken any action
to return and/or summon PW1’. Furthermore the finding lends
credibility to PW1’s testimony that he was asked by the appellant to
come to the appellant’s JPJ office to collect the identity card. If that is
not true, why would the ACA’s officers set up plan to have the marked
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
money handed over to the appellant at the appellant’s JPJ office
since it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances that the ACA
would only hatch a plan for the delivery of the marked money in
accordance with the prior arrangement between the appellant and
PW1.
With regard to this evidence, counsel for the appellant submitted that
the learned trial Judge was wrong to have taken the 4 scenarios
stated at p. 134 of the Appeal Record saying that these scenarios
gave rise to different inferences, some of which are inferences
favourable to the appellant. I do not agree. The four scenarios, in my
view, are nothing more than inferences of fact that the learned trial
Judge had made based on the evidence before him. I think the
learned trial Judge has the right to draw any factual inference which
he deems reasonable on the evidence and circumstances of the
case. The appellate Court ought to be slow in disagreeing with the
inferences drawn unless the inferences are not supported by
evidence. In this case, the learned trial Judge had considered the
fact that the appellant was a senior officer in the team that conducted
the operation and in fact the appellant was the head of the operation
on the material day. On this fact which is not disputed the trial Judge
had asked himself as to why the appellant had not issued the
summons to PW1 when he was in the position to do so and when it
so blatantly clear that PW1 has committed a traffic offence.
It is also incontrovertible evidence in this case that PW1 and PW6
had gone to the appellant’s office accompanied by Mr. Lee (PW8),
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
the ACA’s officer. However at the appellant’s office, only PW1 and
PW6 were allowed into the appellant’s office which was located
behind the public counter. PW8 was asked to wait outside the
counter near the benches meant for public waiting area. However
from where he was standing outside the appellant’s office PW8
testified that he could see what was going on in the office. However
PW8 testified that he could not see when the marked money was
actually given to the appellant because at one point of time when
PW1 and PW6 were still inside the appellant’s office, the appellant
took them to a place in the office which has a partition and PW8 could
not see what transpired behind the partition. PW8 testified that after
PW1 and PW6 came out of the place hidden by the partition they
came to him to inform that the appellant had already taken the
money. When the three of them left and came out of the JPJ area,
PW8 waved his hand to the two other ACA’s officers waiting outside
to signal that the money had been passed. This evidence is
corroborated by the testimonies of PW10 and PW11, the two ACA’s
officers who were on standby to conduct the raid.
On receiving the signal from PW8, the two ACA’s officers PW10 and
PW11 rushed to the appellant’s office. On approaching the
appellant’s office PW11 testified that he saw a male JPJ officer
holding a blue colour diary walking in fast manner towards the toilet in
Block A of the JPJ Office. PW11 followed the JPJ officer to the toilet
and found that the JPJ officer had locked himself in the 2nd toilet.
PW11 kicked the door to the toilet and asked the JPJ officer to open
the door and come out. But the JPJ officer did not do so. Then PW11
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
heard the flushing of the toilet and the sound of running water from
inside the toilet. PW11 then instructed PW10 to climb over through
the toilet next to the 2nd toilet and PW10 did so. PW10 shouted to the
JPJ officer ‘Keluar, Keluar’. With that the JPJ officer opened that
toilet door but he did not come out. According to PW10’s testimony
the JPJ officer, who was in JPJ uniform ‘looked very down’ and PW11
had to pull him out of the toilet. From the name tag on the JPJ
officer’s shirt, PW12 saw the name was Khirudin, the appellant.
PW11 and PW12 conducted a body search on the appellant after he
came out from the toilet. However the trap money was not found on
him. PW11 suspected that the trap money had been flushed down in
the toilet. The appellant was then handed over to the other two ACA’s
officers PW12 and PW15. Meanwhile PW10 and PW11 went to see
the Assistant Director of JPJ to inform about the investigation and to
assist the investigation.
The Assistant Director of JPJ then directed one Mr. Mora and PW5 to
assist PW10 and PW11 to open up the septic tank behind Block A of
the JPJ building to retrieve the marked money which PW11 believed
had been flushed down the toilet by the appellant.
In the course of their investigation in the toilet used by the appellant
and the septic tank at the JPJ office the ACA’s officers with the
assistance of the JPJ personnel found certain items. From the toilet
bowl in the toilet used by the appellant, PW13, another ACA officer
who assisted in the investigation, recovered a hand phone. From the
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
septic tank ID3(d) Mr. Mora, PW15, PW11, PW10 and PW5 found
two pieces of RM50.00 notes floating in it. The two RM50.00 notes
were taken out from the septic tank in the presence of the appellant.
The two RM50.00 notes were identified in Court during the trial as the
marked notes that were given to PW1 and PW6 to be given to the
appellant as trap money. The ACA’s investigation team also
recovered a phone sim card from the septic tank.
In my view the unbroken chain of events and evidence beginning
from the setting up of the trap and the recovery of the trap money and
the other items of exhibit from the toilet bowl and the septic tank
provide sufficient corroboration to the story by PW1 and PW6.
Corroborative evidence need not be direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime. Circumstantial evidence can also be a
corroborative evidence : Basri Bin Sirat v PP [1999] 1 LNS 226; Rex
v Baskerville (1916) 2 KB 658 and PP v Ling Tee Huah [1980] 1 LNS
212.
In PP v Datuk Haji Harun Bin Haji Idris (No.2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15 the
Federal Court ruled at pp. 19-20 as follows:
“It is not necessary that corroboration should be of actual
commission of the crime, for then there would be independent
evidence of the commission of the offence. It would be enough
corroboration if there is independent evidence of relevant
circumstances connecting the accused with the crime”.
11
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
In this instant, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that PW1
and PW6 had put or flushed the marked RM50.00 notes into the toilet
which later found their way to the septic tank. There is also no
challenge put to them that they had done so. The fact is that the last
person that had the trap money before they were recovered from the
septic tank was the appellant himself. In this respect, the appellant
did not challenge in cross-examination that he went to the toilet and
flushed something.
The conduct of the appellant in locking himself up in the toilet despite
being asked by the ACA’s officers to come out and the look on him
when he opened the toilet door which was described as PW10, ‘he
looked very down’ is relevant to show the appellant’s guilt.
Next, counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of the
marked notes in the septic tank does not constitute corroboration. He
argued that PW1 in his testimony under cross-examination had said
that of the two RM50.00 notes he allegedly gave to the appellant, one
piece ‘belonged to me’ and ‘the other piece belonged to BPR’.
Counsel for the defence submitted that PW1, was never asked to
clarify on this testimony by PW1.
This submissions by learned counsel for the appellant may be
considered together with the other ground of appeal raised by
appellant which is that PW1 and PW6 had given two conflicting
version on the money given to the accused. It was submitted that
PW1 testified that one piece of the RM50.00 note given to the
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
appellant was his own money and the other piece of RM50.00
belonged to the ACA. Whereas PW6 testified that the money that was
given to the appellant by PW1 was the same money that was given
by the ACA’s officers to PW6.
The learned trial Judge has addressed this issue in his judgment at
p.186 of the Appeal Record. Having considered the evidence before
him on this point, the learned trial Judge concluded that ‘there was a
slight discrepancy’ in the evidence by PW1 on this issue under crossexamination
vis-à-vis the testimony of PW6. However, the learned
trial Judge found that the discrepancy is not material and not
amounting to a conflicting version of evidence. And at p.187 of the
Appeal Record the learned trial Judge has satisfied himself that ‘as a
whole the trapped (sic) money was found in the septic tank were
prima facie trapped (sic)’. This is a finding of fact by the learned trial
Judge who has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the
witnesses giving evidence before him and observing their demeanour
while doing so. The learned trial Judge therefore is the better Judge
of the fact in issue than the appellate Court. In the circumstance
such finding should not be easily disturbed or interfered with on
appeal.
As to the discrepancy in the testimony of PW1 and PW6 as found by
the learned trial Judge I agree with his conclusion that the
discrepancy does not make PW1’s or PW6’s evidence unacceptable
and that they were unreliable witnesses. In Mohamed Alias v Public
Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 172 the Court held that :
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“The fact that there are discrepancies in a witness’s testimony does
not straightaway make him unreliable witness and make the whole
of his evidence unacceptable. It is open to the court having
observed the demeanour of the witness and after careful
consideration of such discrepancies to accept part of the witness
evidence if it considers them to be true.”
Having regard to the evidence as a whole in this case I find that the
learned trial Judge was justified in concluding that there is a prima
facie case against the appellant at the end of the prosecution’s case.
His decision to call the appellant to enter a defence to the amended
charge was well supported by the evidence. Having scrutinized his
written grounds of decision at pp. 124-143 of the Appeal Record, I am
of the view that the learned trial Judge has given a maximum
evaluation of the evidence before him before he called the appellant
to enter his defence.
The main defence by the appellant is that of a denial. The appellant
denied asking for any money from PW1 for not taking any action
against PW1 for committing a traffic offence of driving without a valid
driving licence and also denied to have received the money at his
office. This defence was considered by the learned trial Judge and he
had rejected it as ‘untruth’ and a ‘blatant denial’. At pp.135-136 of the
Appeal Record, the learned trial Judge addressed this defence and
his impressions of it are as follows:
‘The evidence of the accused that when PW1 and his 2 friends left
the accused’s table after handed over the money whereby the
accused denied to have received and took the said money is most
suspect of its truthfulness and again is blatant denial.’
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The act of the accused when the accused immediately stood up and
at that time saw 3 persons shouted at him, ‘jangan lari,’ and rushed to
the toilet and locked himself in the toilet and then dropped his hand
phone and tried to patch them and due to the fact that the toilet door
was knocked and kicked by the ACA’s officers, the accused’s hand
phone accidentally fell into the toilet bowl because he was shivering
was really a ‘dramatic’ story which truthfulness of its (sic) is most
suspect. The fact that the accused was trying to flush the toilet in
order to retrieve the hand phone from the toilet bowl and took his time
to urinate in the toilet bowl before he opened the door is again most
unbelievable and not reasonable act.
I could not figure out and imagine why the accused has to grab
whatever things on the table and rushed to the toilet and locked
himself inside it and flushed the toilet several times, upon seeing the
3 ACA’s officers entered into JPJ’s office if he did not commit any
wrong and/or have any guilty minds?”
The above passage in the written grounds of decision by the learned
trial Judge speaks for itself as to the learned trial Judge’s evaluation
and assessment of the evidence in this case. And I find no cogent
reasons to fault his finding and conclusion.
On the evidence in this case the learned trial Judge was correct to
invoke the presumption under section 42(1) of the Act. The section
presumed that if it is proven that any gratification has been accepted
or agreed to be accepted, the gratification is accepted or agreed to be
accepted corruptly. At the close of the prosecution’s case and having
considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution before him the
learned trial Judge found that the prosecution had proved the two
main ingredients of the offence in this case that the gratification was
given to or received by the accused and that the accused accepted it
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as an agent of the Government of Malaysia whilst attached as an
Enforcement Officer with the Enforcement Unit in Road Transport
Department, Kuching.
In PP v Mohd Noor Yusof [2008] 7 CLJ 504 it was held that once the
prosecution has proved that gratification was given and accepted, the
presumption under section 42(1) of the Act comes into operation.
With that, the burden now shifts to the accused or appellant to show
on the balance of probability that the gratification was not received
corruptly. In an earlier Privy Counsel case of PP v Yuvaraj [1969] 2
MLJ 89, the Court, in dealing with the presumption under section 14
of the old Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, a section similar to the
present section 42(1) under the Act also stated the same principle.
On the evidence in this instant case, I agree with the learned trial
Judge that the appellant has failed to rebut this presumption on the
balance of probability.
The next ground of appeal by the appellant is that the learned trial
Judge was wrong to draw adverse inference under section 114(g) of
the Evidence Act 1950 against the appellant for not calling Mr. Mora
to testify. Mr. Mora is a JPJ officer who had assisted the ACA’s
officers to recover the trap money Exhibits P5a and P5b from the
septic tank. Mr. Mora was not present during the road block
conducted by the appellant when the appellant stopped PW1 for
driving without valid driving lessons.
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[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that by drawing the
adverse inference against the appellant the learned trial Judge has
shifted the burden of proof to the defence.
It is trite law that in criminal cases the burden to prove the guilt of the
accused lies on the prosecution throughout the whole case; and this
burden is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However the
prosecution may conduct its case in any way that it deems fit. The
prosecution may call any number of witnesses or any person relevant
to its case as a witness. In this instant case, the prosecution did not
call Mr. Mora to testify. Instead the prosecution offered Mr.Mora as a
witness. It is therefore up to the defence to decide whether to take up
the offer by the prosecution. However if the defence refuses to take
up the offer and did not call the witness that was offered to testify no
adverse inference can be drawn against the defence. In this regard I
agree with the appellant’s submissions that by requiring the appellant
to call Mr. Mora to rebut the prosecution’s case the learned trial
Judge had imposed on the defence a burden which the law does not.
It is not the duty of the appellant to prove his innocence. Therefore on
this issue there has been a misdirection on the part of the learned
trial Judge. That said, I do not think the misdirection has occasioned
a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of the case. In my view
there are other ample evidence for the prosecution to prove its case
against the appellant and the learned trial Judge had considered
these evidences and has come to the finding as he did.
17
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
With regards to the grounds in paragraph (g)(i)(ii) of the appellant’s
Petition of Appeal that the trial Judge had erred and failed to direct
his mind adequately or at all regarding the identity of the JPJ officers
who talked to PW6 at the road block and that there was no evidence
to show that the appellant had ever demanded money from PW6. I
accept the submissions by the respondent/prosecution that the
demand for the gratification or solicitation is not an ingredient of the
offence that need to be proved in this case. The appellant was
charged under section 11(a) of the Act for corruptly accepting
gratification. Under the section solicitation is not an ingredient.
In PP v Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 681, 691 the Court
was dealing with an offence under section 4(a) of the 1961 Anti
Corruption Act, which is in pari materia or identical with section 11(a)
in the present case, and the Court held that there the learned trial
Judge had fallen into a serious error in requiring the prosecution to
prove the ingredient of solicitation when it was never an ingredient of
the charge against the accused. This principle was also stated in PP
v Md Nor bin Hamid [2004] 5 MLJ 97.
In paragraph (h) of his Petition of Appeal, the appellant also raised
the issue that the learned trial Judge had erred in taking into
consideration the evidence of PW9 who was arrested in connection
with this instant case. It was submitted in so doing the learned trial
Judge had failed to apply his mind to the proposition of law laid down
in Public Prosecutor v Ku Hang Chua [1975] 2 MLJ 99. In my view
this ground is without merits to persuade me to upset the decision by
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the learned trial Judge. As submitted by the respondent/prosecution,
PW9 was present at the road block when PW1 was stopped and duly
checked for his driving licence. PW9’s evidence was that when PW1
was stopped he took PW1’s identity card and handed it to the
appellant. PW9 was later detained by ACA in the course of
investigation into this case. But he was never charged with any
offence; and in fact he was released subsequently. Perusal of PW9’s
evidence shows that he has no knowledge about the appellant
accepting or receiving money from PW1 in relation to the offence
committed by PW1. It is also pertinent to note that the defence never
challenged PW9 under cross-examination.
In relation to PW9’s evidence, the facts in PP v Ku Hang Chua
(supra) is distinguishable in that in that case the prosecution’s
witness was originally charged with the accused and later the charge
was withdrawn by prosecution with a condition that the witness was
only to be discharged not amounting to acquittal. The witness then
testified as a witness for the prosecution.
In the circumstances therefore, I agree with the respondent that the
learned trial Judge had not erred to take into consideration the
evidence of PW9. The appellant was not prejudiced by that.
All things considered, I am of the view that the appeal against
conviction by the appellant shall be dismissed and the order of
conviction by the learned trial Judge below is hereby affirmed.
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As to the appellant’s appeal against sentence, the Petition of Appeal
does not contain any ground to challenge the sentence imposed as
manifestly excessive or unlawful. Perusal of the Appeal Record at
pp.110-116 shows that the learned trial Judge had applied the correct
sentencing principles. He had taken into consideration the relevant
factors such as public interest, seriousness of the offence, the
deterrence factor and the mitigation by the appellant. The learned trial
Judge also has referred to a number of authorities that established
these principles. In the circumstances, I am inclined not to interfere
with the sentence passed. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal against
sentence is also dismissed.
Finally, having dismissed the appeal, at upon oral application by
counsel for the appellant, I granted the appellant a stay of execution
pending his appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal on the
same terms and conditions as the stay granted by the learned trial
Judge pending the disposal of this appeal by this Court. The stay
however is conditioned upon the appellant paid the fine of
RM10,000.00 imposed by the learned trial Judge.
Order accordingly.
Dated this 10th day of March 2009.
Sgd.
(Y.A. DATO’ ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHIM)
Judge
High Court II Kuching
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Date of Hearing : 7.11.2008, 16.1.2009 and 10.3.2009.
For Appellant : Mr. Anthony Tai,
Messrs. Anthony Tai Advocates,
Kuching.
For Respondent : En. Muhammad bin Sinti,
Deputy Public Prosecutor,
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission,
Kuching.
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
MALAYSIA
IN THE HIGH COURT IN SABAH AND SARAWAK AT KUCHING
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 42-14-2008-II
BETWEEN
MOHD KHIRUDIN BIN YAAKUB … APPELLANT
AND
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT
[From the Kuching Sessions Court Criminal Case No.: SC-61-01-
2006-I]
BETWEEN
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … COMPLAINANT
AND
MOHD KHIRUDIN BIN YAAKUB … ACCUSED
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
Y.A. DATO’ ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHIM
IN OPEN COURT
2
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
JUDGMENT
The appellant was convicted and sentenced on an amended charge
under section 11(a) of the Anti Corruption Act 1997 [‘the Act’] for
accepting a gratification of RM100.00 from one Ong Su Ann (PW1)
as an inducement forbearing not to take action against one Chong
Fook Teck (PW6) who allegedly had committed an offence under
s.26(1) and s.15(1) of Road Traffic Act 1987.
The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and a fine
of RM10,000.00 in default 6 months imprisonment. The appellant was
granted a stay of execution pending the disposal of this appeal.
At the material time the appellant was an Enforcement Officer
attached to the Enforcement Unit, Road Transport Department,
Kuching.
The appellant’s appeal is against conviction and sentence. The
appellant raised several grounds of appeal.
The first ground is that the prosecution has not established a prima
facie case on the essential ingredients of the offence to justify the
calling of the defence. It was argued that the learned trial sessions
Court Judge failed to embark on a maximum evaluation of the
prosecution’s evidence tested in cross-examination on the essential
ingredient of the charge.
3
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The main evidence by the prosecution on the acceptance by the
appellant of the gratification came from the testimonies of PW1 and
PW6. The evidence is that 4th February 2005 at about 9.10 a.m.
PW1 was stopped by the appellant while driving a motor vehicle.
PW1 was asked to produce his driving licence. But PW1 could not do
so. PW1 admitted that he had no driving licence at the material time.
PW1 told the appellant that if the appellant wanted to issue a
summon the appellant has to do it quickly as he (PW1) was in hurry.
The appellant then asked for PW1’s identity card which PW1
subsequently gave to the appellant. But the appellant still refused to
issue PW1 with a summons. Instead, PW1 testified that the appellant
asked him to call the owner of the car that he was driving to come
and see the appellant. Using one of the JPJ officer’s hand-phone,
PW1 called PW6 who later came to the scene. PW1 then tried to
negotiate with the appellant and requested the appellant to forget the
whole thing and asked whether there is any other way to make
resolve the matter fast. PW1 then testified that one of the JPJ’s
officers present at the scene said ‘when you see a road block you
should have at least RM50.00 to settle’. After that, PW1 said the
appellant let him continued on his journey. However, when PW1
asked for the return of his identity card, the appellant told PW1 that if
he wanted his identity card back he could come to the JPJ office later
that day at 2.00 p.m. and to bring along RM100.00 to collect his
identity card.
4
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
The appellant then released PW1 and the latter went back to his
employer’s workshop. PW6 then contacted one of his customers
known as Mr. Lee (PW8) for help. PW6 testified that Mr. Lee was a
policeman. As it turns out Mr. Lee is an officer attached to the ACA.
Soon afterwards Mr. Lee arrived at PW6’s workshop with two other
ACA officers. When PW6 had told the ACA officers about the
incident, he was given two pieces of RM50.00 notes [Exhibits P5 (a)
and (b) ] to be given to the appellant at the appellant’s office, and was
asked to remember the serial number of the two notes. The ACA was
setting up a trap for the appellant.
When PW1 and PW6 went to the appellant’s office later that day,
PW6 placed two (2) RM50.00 notes on the appellant’s table. The
evidence was that the appellant was surprised. After PW1 and PW6
left the appellant’s office they gave a pre-arranged signal to the
waiting ACA’s officers indicating that the money had been given to
the appellant. The ACA’s officers then approached the appellant’s
office. On seeing the approaching ACA’s officers the appellant
grabbed the two RM50.00 notes on his table and quickly walked
towards the toilet. He was followed by the ACA’s officers. Nearing
the toilet the ACA’s officers heard the toilet being flushed. Thereafter
the ACA’s officers rushed to the septic tank where the flushed water
from the toilet flowed. There they managed to retrieve one of the
marked RM50.00 notes. Subsequently the appellant was arrested.
5
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
It was submitted for the appellant that the prosecution must prove
that the appellant received RM100.00 from PW1 and PW6. In this
regard it was argued that PW1 and PW6 trap were witnesses.
The law as to trap witness is that its evidence must be corroborated;
and if it is not corroborated the learned trial Judge must warn himself
of the danger of convicting an accused on an uncorroborated
evidence of such witness: Mohamed Taufik v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 36;
Mohamed Mokhtar v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 22. The rational for this is that
a trap witness is an interested party : Ramli Sutu v PP [1998] 5 CLJ
671.
Counsel for appellant submitted that the failure of the learned trial
Judge to warn himself of the danger of convicting on an
uncorroborated evidence of a trap witness amounts to a misdirection
that occasions a failure and a miscarriage of justice.
The issue at this juncture is whether the learned trial Judge had
misdirected himself on corroboration of PW1 and PW6’s evidence
and whether there is corroboration of their evidence.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial
Judge misdirected himself on corroboration of PW1’s and PW6’s
evidence. He further submitted that the learned trial Judge’s finding
at p.183 of the Appeal Record that the evidence of PW1 and PW6 as
to the money been handed over to the appellant was corroborated
6
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
and therefore attracts the presumption under section 42(1) of the Act
is unsupported by evidence in this instant case.
I do not find any merits in these submissions. There is no doubt that
PW1 and PW6 were trap witnesses. However this fact is amply
recognized by the learned trial Judge when in his judgment at p.185
of the Appeal Record said that ‘[I]n the instant case, though the
money was not found in the possession of the accused after when
the ACA’s officers conducted the arrest, that does not restraint this
Court from making a prima facie finding that the accused had
received the gratification from PW1 as there is direct and
circumstantial evidence to support so.’.
There are evidences to support this conclusion. PW1 testified that he
made several phone calls to the appellant requesting for the return of
his identity card. The appellant denied receiving the phone calls.
However the appellant said the caller was unknown to him; and
because he was annoyed with the calls he had asked the caller to
come to his JPJ’s office. This was fact that was found by the learned
trial Judge as the truth. In his grounds of decision at p. 133 of the
Appeal Record, the learned trial Judge, ‘have noted there were not
less than 3 telephone calls from PW1 to meet and just to collect the
I.C. from the accused whereby the accused has not taken any action
to return and/or summon PW1’. Furthermore the finding lends
credibility to PW1’s testimony that he was asked by the appellant to
come to the appellant’s JPJ office to collect the identity card. If that is
not true, why would the ACA’s officers set up plan to have the marked
7
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
money handed over to the appellant at the appellant’s JPJ office
since it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances that the ACA
would only hatch a plan for the delivery of the marked money in
accordance with the prior arrangement between the appellant and
PW1.
With regard to this evidence, counsel for the appellant submitted that
the learned trial Judge was wrong to have taken the 4 scenarios
stated at p. 134 of the Appeal Record saying that these scenarios
gave rise to different inferences, some of which are inferences
favourable to the appellant. I do not agree. The four scenarios, in my
view, are nothing more than inferences of fact that the learned trial
Judge had made based on the evidence before him. I think the
learned trial Judge has the right to draw any factual inference which
he deems reasonable on the evidence and circumstances of the
case. The appellate Court ought to be slow in disagreeing with the
inferences drawn unless the inferences are not supported by
evidence. In this case, the learned trial Judge had considered the
fact that the appellant was a senior officer in the team that conducted
the operation and in fact the appellant was the head of the operation
on the material day. On this fact which is not disputed the trial Judge
had asked himself as to why the appellant had not issued the
summons to PW1 when he was in the position to do so and when it
so blatantly clear that PW1 has committed a traffic offence.
It is also incontrovertible evidence in this case that PW1 and PW6
had gone to the appellant’s office accompanied by Mr. Lee (PW8),
8
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
the ACA’s officer. However at the appellant’s office, only PW1 and
PW6 were allowed into the appellant’s office which was located
behind the public counter. PW8 was asked to wait outside the
counter near the benches meant for public waiting area. However
from where he was standing outside the appellant’s office PW8
testified that he could see what was going on in the office. However
PW8 testified that he could not see when the marked money was
actually given to the appellant because at one point of time when
PW1 and PW6 were still inside the appellant’s office, the appellant
took them to a place in the office which has a partition and PW8 could
not see what transpired behind the partition. PW8 testified that after
PW1 and PW6 came out of the place hidden by the partition they
came to him to inform that the appellant had already taken the
money. When the three of them left and came out of the JPJ area,
PW8 waved his hand to the two other ACA’s officers waiting outside
to signal that the money had been passed. This evidence is
corroborated by the testimonies of PW10 and PW11, the two ACA’s
officers who were on standby to conduct the raid.
On receiving the signal from PW8, the two ACA’s officers PW10 and
PW11 rushed to the appellant’s office. On approaching the
appellant’s office PW11 testified that he saw a male JPJ officer
holding a blue colour diary walking in fast manner towards the toilet in
Block A of the JPJ Office. PW11 followed the JPJ officer to the toilet
and found that the JPJ officer had locked himself in the 2nd toilet.
PW11 kicked the door to the toilet and asked the JPJ officer to open
the door and come out. But the JPJ officer did not do so. Then PW11
9
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
heard the flushing of the toilet and the sound of running water from
inside the toilet. PW11 then instructed PW10 to climb over through
the toilet next to the 2nd toilet and PW10 did so. PW10 shouted to the
JPJ officer ‘Keluar, Keluar’. With that the JPJ officer opened that
toilet door but he did not come out. According to PW10’s testimony
the JPJ officer, who was in JPJ uniform ‘looked very down’ and PW11
had to pull him out of the toilet. From the name tag on the JPJ
officer’s shirt, PW12 saw the name was Khirudin, the appellant.
PW11 and PW12 conducted a body search on the appellant after he
came out from the toilet. However the trap money was not found on
him. PW11 suspected that the trap money had been flushed down in
the toilet. The appellant was then handed over to the other two ACA’s
officers PW12 and PW15. Meanwhile PW10 and PW11 went to see
the Assistant Director of JPJ to inform about the investigation and to
assist the investigation.
The Assistant Director of JPJ then directed one Mr. Mora and PW5 to
assist PW10 and PW11 to open up the septic tank behind Block A of
the JPJ building to retrieve the marked money which PW11 believed
had been flushed down the toilet by the appellant.
In the course of their investigation in the toilet used by the appellant
and the septic tank at the JPJ office the ACA’s officers with the
assistance of the JPJ personnel found certain items. From the toilet
bowl in the toilet used by the appellant, PW13, another ACA officer
who assisted in the investigation, recovered a hand phone. From the
10
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
septic tank ID3(d) Mr. Mora, PW15, PW11, PW10 and PW5 found
two pieces of RM50.00 notes floating in it. The two RM50.00 notes
were taken out from the septic tank in the presence of the appellant.
The two RM50.00 notes were identified in Court during the trial as the
marked notes that were given to PW1 and PW6 to be given to the
appellant as trap money. The ACA’s investigation team also
recovered a phone sim card from the septic tank.
In my view the unbroken chain of events and evidence beginning
from the setting up of the trap and the recovery of the trap money and
the other items of exhibit from the toilet bowl and the septic tank
provide sufficient corroboration to the story by PW1 and PW6.
Corroborative evidence need not be direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime. Circumstantial evidence can also be a
corroborative evidence : Basri Bin Sirat v PP [1999] 1 LNS 226; Rex
v Baskerville (1916) 2 KB 658 and PP v Ling Tee Huah [1980] 1 LNS
212.
In PP v Datuk Haji Harun Bin Haji Idris (No.2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15 the
Federal Court ruled at pp. 19-20 as follows:
“It is not necessary that corroboration should be of actual
commission of the crime, for then there would be independent
evidence of the commission of the offence. It would be enough
corroboration if there is independent evidence of relevant
circumstances connecting the accused with the crime”.
11
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
In this instant, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that PW1
and PW6 had put or flushed the marked RM50.00 notes into the toilet
which later found their way to the septic tank. There is also no
challenge put to them that they had done so. The fact is that the last
person that had the trap money before they were recovered from the
septic tank was the appellant himself. In this respect, the appellant
did not challenge in cross-examination that he went to the toilet and
flushed something.
The conduct of the appellant in locking himself up in the toilet despite
being asked by the ACA’s officers to come out and the look on him
when he opened the toilet door which was described as PW10, ‘he
looked very down’ is relevant to show the appellant’s guilt.
Next, counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of the
marked notes in the septic tank does not constitute corroboration. He
argued that PW1 in his testimony under cross-examination had said
that of the two RM50.00 notes he allegedly gave to the appellant, one
piece ‘belonged to me’ and ‘the other piece belonged to BPR’.
Counsel for the defence submitted that PW1, was never asked to
clarify on this testimony by PW1.
This submissions by learned counsel for the appellant may be
considered together with the other ground of appeal raised by
appellant which is that PW1 and PW6 had given two conflicting
version on the money given to the accused. It was submitted that
PW1 testified that one piece of the RM50.00 note given to the
12
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
appellant was his own money and the other piece of RM50.00
belonged to the ACA. Whereas PW6 testified that the money that was
given to the appellant by PW1 was the same money that was given
by the ACA’s officers to PW6.
The learned trial Judge has addressed this issue in his judgment at
p.186 of the Appeal Record. Having considered the evidence before
him on this point, the learned trial Judge concluded that ‘there was a
slight discrepancy’ in the evidence by PW1 on this issue under crossexamination
vis-à-vis the testimony of PW6. However, the learned
trial Judge found that the discrepancy is not material and not
amounting to a conflicting version of evidence. And at p.187 of the
Appeal Record the learned trial Judge has satisfied himself that ‘as a
whole the trapped (sic) money was found in the septic tank were
prima facie trapped (sic)’. This is a finding of fact by the learned trial
Judge who has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the
witnesses giving evidence before him and observing their demeanour
while doing so. The learned trial Judge therefore is the better Judge
of the fact in issue than the appellate Court. In the circumstance
such finding should not be easily disturbed or interfered with on
appeal.
As to the discrepancy in the testimony of PW1 and PW6 as found by
the learned trial Judge I agree with his conclusion that the
discrepancy does not make PW1’s or PW6’s evidence unacceptable
and that they were unreliable witnesses. In Mohamed Alias v Public
Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 172 the Court held that :
13
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
“The fact that there are discrepancies in a witness’s testimony does
not straightaway make him unreliable witness and make the whole
of his evidence unacceptable. It is open to the court having
observed the demeanour of the witness and after careful
consideration of such discrepancies to accept part of the witness
evidence if it considers them to be true.”
Having regard to the evidence as a whole in this case I find that the
learned trial Judge was justified in concluding that there is a prima
facie case against the appellant at the end of the prosecution’s case.
His decision to call the appellant to enter a defence to the amended
charge was well supported by the evidence. Having scrutinized his
written grounds of decision at pp. 124-143 of the Appeal Record, I am
of the view that the learned trial Judge has given a maximum
evaluation of the evidence before him before he called the appellant
to enter his defence.
The main defence by the appellant is that of a denial. The appellant
denied asking for any money from PW1 for not taking any action
against PW1 for committing a traffic offence of driving without a valid
driving licence and also denied to have received the money at his
office. This defence was considered by the learned trial Judge and he
had rejected it as ‘untruth’ and a ‘blatant denial’. At pp.135-136 of the
Appeal Record, the learned trial Judge addressed this defence and
his impressions of it are as follows:
‘The evidence of the accused that when PW1 and his 2 friends left
the accused’s table after handed over the money whereby the
accused denied to have received and took the said money is most
suspect of its truthfulness and again is blatant denial.’
14
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
The act of the accused when the accused immediately stood up and
at that time saw 3 persons shouted at him, ‘jangan lari,’ and rushed to
the toilet and locked himself in the toilet and then dropped his hand
phone and tried to patch them and due to the fact that the toilet door
was knocked and kicked by the ACA’s officers, the accused’s hand
phone accidentally fell into the toilet bowl because he was shivering
was really a ‘dramatic’ story which truthfulness of its (sic) is most
suspect. The fact that the accused was trying to flush the toilet in
order to retrieve the hand phone from the toilet bowl and took his time
to urinate in the toilet bowl before he opened the door is again most
unbelievable and not reasonable act.
I could not figure out and imagine why the accused has to grab
whatever things on the table and rushed to the toilet and locked
himself inside it and flushed the toilet several times, upon seeing the
3 ACA’s officers entered into JPJ’s office if he did not commit any
wrong and/or have any guilty minds?”
The above passage in the written grounds of decision by the learned
trial Judge speaks for itself as to the learned trial Judge’s evaluation
and assessment of the evidence in this case. And I find no cogent
reasons to fault his finding and conclusion.
On the evidence in this case the learned trial Judge was correct to
invoke the presumption under section 42(1) of the Act. The section
presumed that if it is proven that any gratification has been accepted
or agreed to be accepted, the gratification is accepted or agreed to be
accepted corruptly. At the close of the prosecution’s case and having
considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution before him the
learned trial Judge found that the prosecution had proved the two
main ingredients of the offence in this case that the gratification was
given to or received by the accused and that the accused accepted it
15
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
as an agent of the Government of Malaysia whilst attached as an
Enforcement Officer with the Enforcement Unit in Road Transport
Department, Kuching.
In PP v Mohd Noor Yusof [2008] 7 CLJ 504 it was held that once the
prosecution has proved that gratification was given and accepted, the
presumption under section 42(1) of the Act comes into operation.
With that, the burden now shifts to the accused or appellant to show
on the balance of probability that the gratification was not received
corruptly. In an earlier Privy Counsel case of PP v Yuvaraj [1969] 2
MLJ 89, the Court, in dealing with the presumption under section 14
of the old Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, a section similar to the
present section 42(1) under the Act also stated the same principle.
On the evidence in this instant case, I agree with the learned trial
Judge that the appellant has failed to rebut this presumption on the
balance of probability.
The next ground of appeal by the appellant is that the learned trial
Judge was wrong to draw adverse inference under section 114(g) of
the Evidence Act 1950 against the appellant for not calling Mr. Mora
to testify. Mr. Mora is a JPJ officer who had assisted the ACA’s
officers to recover the trap money Exhibits P5a and P5b from the
septic tank. Mr. Mora was not present during the road block
conducted by the appellant when the appellant stopped PW1 for
driving without valid driving lessons.
16
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that by drawing the
adverse inference against the appellant the learned trial Judge has
shifted the burden of proof to the defence.
It is trite law that in criminal cases the burden to prove the guilt of the
accused lies on the prosecution throughout the whole case; and this
burden is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However the
prosecution may conduct its case in any way that it deems fit. The
prosecution may call any number of witnesses or any person relevant
to its case as a witness. In this instant case, the prosecution did not
call Mr. Mora to testify. Instead the prosecution offered Mr.Mora as a
witness. It is therefore up to the defence to decide whether to take up
the offer by the prosecution. However if the defence refuses to take
up the offer and did not call the witness that was offered to testify no
adverse inference can be drawn against the defence. In this regard I
agree with the appellant’s submissions that by requiring the appellant
to call Mr. Mora to rebut the prosecution’s case the learned trial
Judge had imposed on the defence a burden which the law does not.
It is not the duty of the appellant to prove his innocence. Therefore on
this issue there has been a misdirection on the part of the learned
trial Judge. That said, I do not think the misdirection has occasioned
a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of the case. In my view
there are other ample evidence for the prosecution to prove its case
against the appellant and the learned trial Judge had considered
these evidences and has come to the finding as he did.
17
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
With regards to the grounds in paragraph (g)(i)(ii) of the appellant’s
Petition of Appeal that the trial Judge had erred and failed to direct
his mind adequately or at all regarding the identity of the JPJ officers
who talked to PW6 at the road block and that there was no evidence
to show that the appellant had ever demanded money from PW6. I
accept the submissions by the respondent/prosecution that the
demand for the gratification or solicitation is not an ingredient of the
offence that need to be proved in this case. The appellant was
charged under section 11(a) of the Act for corruptly accepting
gratification. Under the section solicitation is not an ingredient.
In PP v Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 681, 691 the Court
was dealing with an offence under section 4(a) of the 1961 Anti
Corruption Act, which is in pari materia or identical with section 11(a)
in the present case, and the Court held that there the learned trial
Judge had fallen into a serious error in requiring the prosecution to
prove the ingredient of solicitation when it was never an ingredient of
the charge against the accused. This principle was also stated in PP
v Md Nor bin Hamid [2004] 5 MLJ 97.
In paragraph (h) of his Petition of Appeal, the appellant also raised
the issue that the learned trial Judge had erred in taking into
consideration the evidence of PW9 who was arrested in connection
with this instant case. It was submitted in so doing the learned trial
Judge had failed to apply his mind to the proposition of law laid down
in Public Prosecutor v Ku Hang Chua [1975] 2 MLJ 99. In my view
this ground is without merits to persuade me to upset the decision by
18
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
the learned trial Judge. As submitted by the respondent/prosecution,
PW9 was present at the road block when PW1 was stopped and duly
checked for his driving licence. PW9’s evidence was that when PW1
was stopped he took PW1’s identity card and handed it to the
appellant. PW9 was later detained by ACA in the course of
investigation into this case. But he was never charged with any
offence; and in fact he was released subsequently. Perusal of PW9’s
evidence shows that he has no knowledge about the appellant
accepting or receiving money from PW1 in relation to the offence
committed by PW1. It is also pertinent to note that the defence never
challenged PW9 under cross-examination.
In relation to PW9’s evidence, the facts in PP v Ku Hang Chua
(supra) is distinguishable in that in that case the prosecution’s
witness was originally charged with the accused and later the charge
was withdrawn by prosecution with a condition that the witness was
only to be discharged not amounting to acquittal. The witness then
testified as a witness for the prosecution.
In the circumstances therefore, I agree with the respondent that the
learned trial Judge had not erred to take into consideration the
evidence of PW9. The appellant was not prejudiced by that.
All things considered, I am of the view that the appeal against
conviction by the appellant shall be dismissed and the order of
conviction by the learned trial Judge below is hereby affirmed.
19
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
As to the appellant’s appeal against sentence, the Petition of Appeal
does not contain any ground to challenge the sentence imposed as
manifestly excessive or unlawful. Perusal of the Appeal Record at
pp.110-116 shows that the learned trial Judge had applied the correct
sentencing principles. He had taken into consideration the relevant
factors such as public interest, seriousness of the offence, the
deterrence factor and the mitigation by the appellant. The learned trial
Judge also has referred to a number of authorities that established
these principles. In the circumstances, I am inclined not to interfere
with the sentence passed. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal against
sentence is also dismissed.
Finally, having dismissed the appeal, at upon oral application by
counsel for the appellant, I granted the appellant a stay of execution
pending his appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal on the
same terms and conditions as the stay granted by the learned trial
Judge pending the disposal of this appeal by this Court. The stay
however is conditioned upon the appellant paid the fine of
RM10,000.00 imposed by the learned trial Judge.
Order accordingly.
Dated this 10th day of March 2009.
Sgd.
(Y.A. DATO’ ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHIM)
Judge
High Court II Kuching
20
[CRA-42-14-2008-II]
Date of Hearing : 7.11.2008, 16.1.2009 and 10.3.2009.
For Appellant : Mr. Anthony Tai,
Messrs. Anthony Tai Advocates,
Kuching.
For Respondent : En. Muhammad bin Sinti,
Deputy Public Prosecutor,
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission,
Kuching.
